The Nordic Africa Institute – Publications

There is profound concern in large circles in Africa that the Cotonou Agreement obstructs African governments from supporting domestic production, and that the EU is splitting Africa in two by striking separate deals with different African regions. These perceptions are important considerations for those involved in the upcoming negotiations to replace the existing agreement.

The People’s Democratic Party (PDP) was established in 1998 at the time when Nigeria was under pressure from the international community to undertake political reform in preparation for anticipated return to civil rule. The PDP formed the first government after the country re-introduced civil rule in May 1999 and remained the ruling party at the national level and also in government in the majority of states of the federation until May 2015 when it lost to the All Progressives Congress (APC) in the presidential election, and unexpectedly recorded defeat in the other elections. The climax was on March 28, 2015 when Nigeria held its fifth presidential election and an incumbent president, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan was defeated by retired Major-General Mohammed Buhari who was contesting the presidential election for the fourth time. Apart from its remarkable victory in the previous four successive presidential elections, the PDP had a comfortable majority in the national legislature between 1999 and 2015. However, towards the end of President Obasanjo’s tenure, the party had started to experience disturbing cracks in its internal cohesion. It eventual defeat by the APC at both the presidential and state levels puts an abrupt end to the hegemony of the self-styled “largest political party in Africa” with a vision of “ruling Nigeria for sixty years”. This chapter presents analysis of the remote and immediate causes of the poor performance of the PDP in the 2015 elections. What are the remote and immediate causes of the defeat of the PDP in the 2015 elections? What was the nature of public support for the party and its presidential candidate?  Was the dwindling public support for the party linked to its diagnostic analysis of the challenges of governance and development in the country? What was the role of the Jonathan presidency in the political misfortune of the party? What was the capacity of the party to cope with some of the changes and innovations in the electoral process that may have contributed to the outcomes of the 2015 elections?  How has the PDP faired since the inauguration of the new APC-led government? Is the party adjusting well to playing the role of an opposition party? How well has the party faired in this regard, and what are the lessons learned? And finally, how does the electoral misfortune of the PDP helps us to understand the strength and weaknesses of the democratic institutions in Nigeria? As many are these questions that one consider useful for understanding the party system in modern Nigeria.

Peace is not just the absence of conflict. The self-interest lying behind external ‘support’ can take many shapes. The pursuit of justice can sometimes thwart peace efforts. And, last but not least, simply adding more women to peace negotiations will not break male-centric norms.

This chapter attempts to address three key questions: First, how is Professor Sulayman Nyang’s scholarly contributions and policy prescriptions understood and responded to in broad intellectual discourse on Africa and international terrorism? Second, what is the status of the war against terrorism in the external relations of Africa states with special attention to relations with the United States and other Western Powers?  Third, what is the relevance of the global war on terrorism in international relations today?   The chapter notes Professor Sulayman Nyang’s contributions to the scholarship on  Islamic militancy, international terrorism and the US-led global war against terrorism including  his deep insights on changes in the international system and Africa. Africa is generally regarded in the West as the weakest link in the war against international terrorism; it is the political territory that can easily be penetrated by international terrorists. African states are poor, weak and corrupt. These failed states do not have effective government that is able to deliver public goods to its population or even exercise control over much of its territory. In this way these states are threat both to their citizens and the international community that comes under risk as a result of possible violent reactions by deprived and frustrated citizens that generate global problems including international terrorism. However, while many African governments have not earned the respect of the Western countries, the latter have maintained close economic relationship with them most arguably for economic and geo-political importance. These strong ties between Africa and Western countries have spill over to the security sector with the United States and other Western Powers providing assistance and support to help African governments develop and manage their anti-terrorist and counter insurgencies strategies.

Armed insurgencies, social cleavages and governance deficits relating to authoritarian rule and abuse of state resources all imperil peace and stability in Southern Africa. The Southern African Development Community’s institutional framework for regional peace and security is proving ineffective because its leaders are unwilling to enforce democratic principles.

In light of a recent UN Security Council resolution on the Lake Chad region, this policy note identifies major challenges that need to be addressed to create conditions for actors in the region to build a lasting peace. The issues include demobilising local vigilantes and resolving land-related conflicts.

Two decades after the ‘third wave of democratization’, extensive violence continues to follow elections in sub-Saharan Africa. Whereas national processes connected to pre-election violence have received increased scholarly attention, little is known of local dynamics of violence after elections. This article examines the 2011 Nigerian post-election violence with regard to the ways in which national electoral processes interweave with local social and political disputes. The most affected state, Kaduna State, has a history of violent local relations connected to which group should control politics and the state. It is argued that electoral polarisation aggravated national ethno-religious divisions that corresponded to the dividing line of the conflict in Kaduna. A rapid escalation of violence was facilitated by local social networks nurtured by ethno-religious grievances.

The Global South is generally understood to refer to less economically developed countries. It is a broad term that comprises a variety of states with diverse levels of economic, cultural, and political influence in the international order. Although International Relations is an interdisciplinary field of study, it has historically been studied from a very Eurocentric perspective that does not always help us to understand developments occurring in  the  Global  South. Understanding Global South perspectives starts with a discussion of the Western-centric focus of mainstream IR theories. It also recognises the challenges facing scholars from the Global South that might help to explain why Global South perspectives are largely absent from mainstream debates. The ultimate goal is to broaden the field of view within IR theory to incorporate a more just and representative understanding of international relations.The main weakness of mainstream Western IR theories is that they are not universally experienced as mainstream. The concepts they are based on do not unequivocally reflect or match the reality in many Global South states. Furthermore, certain questions that are central to Global South perspectives are absent or under-theorised in mainstream scholarship. Tickner (2016, 1) for example points out that issues of race and empire have been missing from mainstream theories despite the existence of solid scholarship in postcolonial and poststructuralist studies. Curiously, she adds, colonial dominations profoundly shaped the state of the current global order, yet they are not even remotely central to mainstream IR. Today, there is a growing body of scholarship that pays attention to the context of international relations theories in Africa, Asia and Latin America and to the diverse interpretations within these vast regions. Much of this scholarship has been produced under the umbrella term of ‘global IR’.

This paper examines the role of the international community in the Eritrean refugee crisis. It critically analyses the international community's, as represented by UN, AU, EU and US, failure to fulfill its obligation. The UN, OAU, EU and US were witnesses and guarantors of the Algiers Agreement. As such, they assumed responsibility of making sure of the implementation of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Commission Verdict. The Algiers Agreement empowered the guarantors to invoke UN Chapter VII, if one or both of the parties violates its commitment. Fourteen years later the EEBC Verdict is awaiting implementation with immense consequence to Eritrea. Deriving from text analysis and drawing on previous research I argue in this article that the international community by failing to fulfill its legal obligation contributed to the current Eritrean refugee crisis. It is the contention of this article only the unconditional implementation of the boundary commission that brings peace and stability to the region that would stem the flow of the refugees.

Enforce the ‘African solutions to African problems’ principle in the UN and promote cooperation with the African Union and its regional communities. That is what Ethiopia should work for during its two-year term in the Security Council. To perform on this global stage, the Ethiopian government has to address its domestic democracy and governance issues.

The benefits of winning elections, and the disadvantages of losing them, must be reduced to avoid the violence that a winner-takes-all situation can trigger. Election observers should pay more attention to subtle forms of violence, intra-party tensions and incumbents playing the security card to justify increased use of force. This policy note considers how to curb the increase of violence in African elections.

The G5 Sahel initiative goes some way to make up for the lack of supranational coordination in the troubled Sahel region. If moulded in the interests of development, it could bring about positive change. But the initiative risks becoming yet another excuse to get more ‘boots on the ground’, if external stakeholders place too much emphasis on fighting terror and stopping migration.

Lack of resources makes the African Union dependent on external funding for military support and peacebuilding. Policy makers who want to support the AU and its members in their efforts to avoid becoming pieces in external powers’ geopolitical puzzle, should promote non-military solutions to security challenges.

When will we see a regional UN headquarter for migration in Rabat, or a centre of excellence for ocean studies in Tripoli? In this policy note, NAI researcher Mikael Eriksson recommends outside-the-box thinking, in an effort to gain a fresh perspective on a region that may have lost its spring-time energy, but not the idea itself – or the people behind it.

On 9 June 2017 Namibia became poorer. A moral beacon physically left behind the people, whose right to live in freedom and dignity was his core motivation throughout most of his 92 years. (Herman) Andimba Toivo Ya Toivo – Toivo is Finnish for hope – was active until the end. He had just returned from a trip with his close friend and fellow inmate on Robben Island Helao Shityuwe – another largely ignored and little recognized icon in Namibia’s struggle for liberation. Hours later, at his home, Ya Toivo died in his sleep. The article combines a portrait of Ya Toivo and his legacy with the heroic narratives at play when the history of the liberation struggle is rewritten for political purposes.

This article presents an anatomy of power relations and policymaking within the ranks of the former liberation movement South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia. It summarizes the features of Namibia's dominant party state and argues that Namibia is a case of competitive authoritarian rule. Our analysis documents how the first generation of SWAPO activists, in exile after the early 1960s, has since independence in 1990 remained the most influential segment of the former anti-colonial movement. This continuity is personified in the country's third president, Hage Geingob, and parts of his team in cabinet. Despite some gradual and increasingly visible shifts in the composition of SWAPO MPs, the party's first generation has so far remained largely in control of the country's political affairs. Analysing the background of the ministers serving since independence also shows that a second generation of SWAPO activists, in exile after the mid-1970s, gradually expanded their influence and took over leading positions. Given the dominance of SWAPO and the lack of any meaningful political opposition, a new leadership depends on upward inner-party mobility. Given the limited scope for a younger generation to move into higher offices, the strengthening of democracy through new leadership and innovative thinking is very limited. Rather, politics tends to be reproduced through established networks and bonds with a low degree of permissiveness, which reinforces the nature of the competitive authoritarian regime under the control of ‘old men’.

Mit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges 1989, der Unabhängigkeit Namibias 1990 und dem Sturz des Apartheidregimes in Südafrika 1994 begann für viele Länder des südlichen Afrikas eine Zeit relativer Stabilität und des politischen Pluralismus. Die Friedensdividende erfüllte jedoch nicht die in sie gesetzten Erwartungen. Der Demokratisierungsprozess der Southern-African-Development-Community-Staaten (SADC) verläuft unübersichtlich; eine Wende hin zu autoritären Tendenzen zeichnet sich bei einigen Mitgliedstaaten ab.

Violent political revolt has been common in independent Uganda. For a long time such revolts were exclusively expressed as rural-based rebel groups fighting the government. Since the mid-2000s, however, this seems to have come to an end. Instead, urban riots, very rare in the past, have become much more common. This article analyses the changing patterns of types and location of violent political revolt in Uganda under the National Resistance Movement. It argues that the earlier prevalence of rural rebellions can be explained by the combination of a coercive and militarised state, and weak and ethnically factionalised political forces who took their violent resistance to rural regional bases. Over time, however, government counter-insurgency became more effective and the conditions for insurgency were undermined by withdrawal of external support. Furthermore, the reintroduction of multi-party politics in 2005 opened up new avenues for political expression. The changes to the political system were however more nominal than real in many respects. While the rebel option had become less attractive and feasible, a series of social, economic and political grievances remained which were only partly channelled through party politics. They also found expression through sporadic urban violent revolt.

Multiparty elections have become the bellwether by which all democracies are judged, and the spread of these systems across Africa has been widely hailed as a sign of the continent’s progress towards stability and prosperity. But such elections bring their own challenges, particularly the often intense internecine violence following disputed results.While the consequences of such violence can be profound, undermining the legitimacy of the democratic process and in some cases plunging countries into civil war or renewed dictatorship, little is known about the causes.

By mapping, analysing and comparing instances of election violence in different localities across Africa – including Kenya, Ivory Coast and Uganda – this collection of detailed case studies sheds light on the underlying dynamics and sub-national causes behind electoral conflicts, revealing them to be the result of a complex interplay between democratisation and the older, patronage-based system of ‘Big Man’ politics.

Essential for scholars and policymakers across the social sciences and humanities interested in democratization, peace-keeping and peace studies, Violence in African Elections provides important insights into why some communities prove more prone to electoral violence than others, offering practical suggestions for preventing violence through improved electoral monitoring, voter education, and international assistance.

Post-war democratization has been identified as a crucial mechanism to build peace in war-ridden societies, supposedly allowing belligerents to compete through ballots rather than bullets. A byproduct of this process, however, is that military leaders often become an integral part of the new democratic system, using resources and networks generated from the previous war to dominate the emerging political landscape.

The crucial and thus-far overlooked question to be addressed, therefore, is what effect the inclusion of ex-militaries into electoral politics has on post-war security. Can 'warlord democrats' make a positive contribution by shepherding their wartime constituencies to support the building of peace and democracy, or are they likely to use their electoral platforms to sponsor political violence and keep war-affected communities mobilized through aggressive discourses?

This important volume, containing a wealth of fresh empirical detail and theoretical insight, and focussing on some of Africa's most high-profile political figures – from Paul Kagame to Riek Machar to Afonso Dhlakama – represents a crucial intervention in the literature of post-war democratization.

The training of Angolan police officers under various international cooperation programs contributes to the construction of an original policing model in the country. The end of the war, the creation of training facilities in the country and the development of public policies favourable to the development of the national police lead to the renewal of the sector based on a model in a way hybrid as a result of various influences progressively built over the years. This article analyses these changes based on data collected in Angola as part of a wider research about the context of international cooperation in the area of training ofpolice officers.